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Opening the Can of Worms and Putting Them Back
in: An Analysis of New Louisiana Civil Code Article
2695'
INTRODUCTION
The lessee-lessor relationship is one of the most common
juridical relationships known to the law. As such, one would
expect the law to clearly define the parameters of this relationship
and to detail the rights and obligations of the parties thereto.
Unfortunately, Louisiana's law of property and lease does virtually
nothing to address one of the most fundamental concerns of these
contracting parties--constructions or improvements the lessee
makes on land during the lease term.
Suppose, for example, a lessee builds a house and swimming
pool on land belonging to the lessor. Suppose further that the
lessee decides that he does not want an above-ground pool, but
also does not want to pay the cost of installing a concrete pool. So,
the lessee decides to dig a hole himself, buy an above-ground pool,
and put it in the hole. What happens at the end of the lease?
Under Louisiana's law of lease prior to 2005, there was no clear
answer to questions such as who owns the pool, whether the
landowner must pay the lessee for the pool, or whether the
landowner could demand that the lessee remove the pool.
What happens to the house constructed by a lessee on leased
premises? Must it be torn down, and if so, at whose expense?
May it remain? If so, must the landowner pay the lessee for the
increased value of the land due to the construction of the house?
Under Louisiana's law of lease prior to 2005, the lessee owns the
house and has the right to remove it.2 If the lessee does not
remove it, the landowner may either become the owner of the
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
1. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (2006). Due to its complexity, the
Louisiana law of accession has been referred to as a "pile of 'cans of worms."'
Symeon Symeonides, Developments in the Law: 1985-1986: Property, 47 LA.
L. REv. 429, 451 (1986).
2. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2726 (1980), amended and reenacted sub nom
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 by 2004 La. Acts No. 821, § 1.
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house or let it stay on his land without becoming the owner.3 Is
this not an unfair result for unsightly and unwanted constructions?
Should the landowner be forced to keep such items on his land?
These issues were exceptionally problematic when the
landowner did not consent to the lessee's construction of the
house. According to Louisiana's law of lease prior to 2005, the
unconsenting landowner owns the house and owes nothing to the
lessee.4 Is it not unfair to the lessee to provide no measure of
reimbursement for his legitimate expenses in constructing this
improvement, which may be quite substantial? Is forcing a
landowner to own a construction he does not desire a sufficient
remedy to the problem?
Louisiana's law of lease prior to 2005 created these and other
troubling issues with respect to the resolution of landlord-tenant
construction disputes. However, after a ten-year revision process,
the Louisiana Law Institute recently completed a comprehensive
revision of the Civil Code's law of lease. The lease revision was
adopted during the 2004 legislative session and became effective
January 1, 2005. 5 This comment focuses on one particular change
made by the new Louisiana Civil Code articles on lease. In
particular, it will analyze new article 2695 addressing attachments,
additions, or other improvements to leased things.
6
Prior to the 2005 revision, improvements to leased things were
regulated solely by cross-reference to the general accession code
articles in the Property section of the Louisiana Civil Code.7 This
cross-reference created a number of gaps in the Code and
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 2004 La. Acts No. 821, § 1 (effective Jan. 1, 2005) (a complete revision
of Book II, Title IX of the Louisiana Civil Code entitled "Lease").
6. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (2006). Pre-revision article 2695 (1870),
which dealt with the lessor's liability for damages from vices and defects, is now
covered under article 2696. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2696 (2006).
7. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2726 (1980). The cross-reference has existed
since 1980. Prior to 1980, article 2726 provided:
The lessee has a right to remove the improvements and additions which
he has made to the thing let, provided he leaves it in the state in which
he received it. But if these additions be made with lime and cement,
the lessor may retain them, on paying a fair price.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2726 (1870), amended and reenacted sub nom
article LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 by 2004 La. Acts No. 821, § 1.
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incorporated "numerous deficiencies and inequities" of the law of
accession into the law of lease. 8 Those demonstrated in the
opening hypothetical give just a small glimpse of the problem.
This comment compares pre-revision Louisiana Civil Code
article 2726, dealing with improvements made to leased property
by cross-reference to the law of accession, with its replacement,
article 2695. Part I explores the gaps and inequities of the pre-
revision cross-reference to the law of accession. Part II considers
whether the 2005 lease revision and creation of new article 2695
solves those problems, and notes some new, and likely unforeseen,
problems created by the new article.
I. THE PRE-REVISION LAW OF LEASE:- CHAOS CREATED BY CROSS-
REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF ACCESSION
To appreciate the extent to which the revised law of lease
solves the problems of constructions made to leased property, it is
necessary to examine the rules from which the Lease Committee
expressly chose to depart. Again, prior to 2005, cross-reference
made general law of accession the Louisiana law of lease regarding
improvements made to leased property as well. 9
A. Accession in General
The Louisiana Civil Code's lynchpin article on accession
provides that "[tihe ownership of a thing includes by accession the
ownership of everything that it produces or is united with it, either
naturally or artificially."' 0 Consider, for example, the situation
where a lessee constructs a building on the land of the lessor. The
law of accession provides the rules for what happens now that the
building and land are united. The laws on accession control both
ownership (who owns the building) and remedies (what rights the
landowner has to remove the building from his land, as well as
8. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 cmt. (c) (2006).
9. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2726 (1980) (amended 2004). Of course, the
general accession rules still apply to all other improvements made outside of the
lease relationship. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 493, 493.1, 495-97, 2695
(2006).
10. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 482 (2006).
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what rights the builder has to either remove it or be compensated
for his expenses)." The following sections explore the ownership
and remedial rules of accession, with particular emphasis on the
flaws of the articles as applied in the lease context.
B. The Accession Articles' Rules of Ownership
Who owns an improvement will depend on two fundamental
questions. First, is it even possible for an improvement to be
owned separately from the underlying immovable? Second, if it is
possible, which types of improvements are capable of being owned
separately?
1. Is Separate Ownership Possible?
Historically, if a person constructed a building or planted crops
on another's land, there was no question that the new thing
belonged to the owner of the ground. 12 In Roman law and in the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, component parts of a tract of land
could not be owned by someone other than the owner of the
ground.' 3
Gradually, however, jurisprudence and legislation changed. 4
Courts began by recognizing that standing crops and timber could
be owned by someone other than the owner of the ground.' 5 Now,
the Louisiana Civil Code recognizes that "buildings, other
constructions permanently attached to the ground, standing timber,
and unharvested crops or ungathered fruits of trees" may belong to
a person other than the owner of the ground. 16  Not all
"constructions" may be separately owned, though. Some
constructions, such as things "incorporated into a tract of land, a
building, or other construction, so as to become an integral part of
11. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 493,493.1,495-97,2695 (2006).
12. A.N. Yiannopoulos, PROPERTY § 116, in 2 LOUIsIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 268 (4th ed. 2001). See also Baldwin v. Union Ins. Co., 2 Rob. 133
(La. 1842).
13. Yiannopoulos, supra note 12, at § 116, at268.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 491 (2006).
[Vol. 67574
COMMENTS
it,' 17 are still subject to the old Roman rule and may not be owned
separately from the ground.18
2. Distinguishing Between Things That Can Be Owned
Separately and Things That Cannot
Obviously, determining whether an improvement falls within
the category of things that. can be owned separately from the
ground, or within the category that cannot, is a prerequisite to
determining ownership of the improvement. However, in the case
of constructions attached to the ground, this is an especially
challenging task because the categories overlap.
Ownership of an improvement is governed by either Louisiana
Civil Code article 493 or 493.1, depending on what type of thing is
united with the underlying immovable. Article 493 covers the
things that are capable of being owned separately from the
ground. 19 Within this category, ownership depends on the consent
of the landowner. 20 If these constructions are made without the
landowner's consent, they belong to the landowner. 2 1 If, however,
they are made with the landowner's consent, they belong to the
maker.22
Article 493.1, on the other hand, covers things that are not
capable of being owned separately from the ground.23 These
17. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 465 (2006). Building materials are one such
example. Id.
18. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 465,466,493.1 (2006).
19. The things susceptible of separate ownership include: buildings, other
constructions permanently attached to the ground, standing timber, and
unharvested crops or ungathered fruits of trees. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
491 (2006).
20. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 493 (2006).
21. Id.
22. Id.; S. Casing of La., Inc. v. Houma Avionics, Inc., 809 So. 2d 1040,
1052 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2001) (evidence as to whether the landowner consented
to an airplane hangar being built on his land was required to determine
ownership of the hangar).
23. These include things incorporated into a tract of land, a building, or
other construction so as to become an integral part of it, or things permanently
attached to a building or other construction. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 493.1
(2006) (cross-referencing articles 465 and 466).
2007]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
things are owned by the landowner regardless of his consent
because they are incapable of separate ownership.
Recall, for example, the opening hypothetical. Should the
underground swimming pool be treated under article 493 or 493.1 ?
Is it an "other construction permanently attached to the ground" or
a thing so incorporated into a tract of land as to become an
"integral part" of it? If it is the former, the lessee owns the pool
because the landowner consented to its addition to the land. If it is
the latter, the landowner owns the pool. Under the current
legislation, there is no way to determine whether the pool is
"permanently attached" to or an "integral part" of the ground, and
thus no way to know who owns it.
This overlap has been noted by a number of legal scholars, and
Louisiana courts have provided little help in defining the
parameters of the two articles. 24 Often courts simply assume the
thing falls into one category or the other and move on with little or
no analysis. For instance, wood pilings, 25 oil well casings,
26
underground pipelines,27 permanent billboards,28 and underground
drainage systems29 have all been assumed to be other constructions
permanently attached to the ground, which are capable of separate
ownership. On the other hand, fill dirt, septic systems, 31 and
24. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 444-52; Symeon Symeonides,
Developments in the Law: 1983-1984: Property, 45 LA. L. REV. 541, 541-49
(1984) [hereinafter Symeonides, 1983-1984]; Symeon Symeonides,
Developments in the Law: 1982-1983: Property, 44 LA. L. REv. 505, 519-27
(1983) [hereinafter Symeonides, 1982-1983].
25. Anderson v. Tenneco Oil Co., 826 So. 2d 1143, 1148 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 828 So. 2d 585 (La. 2002).
26. Melerine v. State, 773 So. 2d 831, 835-40 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000), writ
denied, 789 So. 2d 595 (La. 2001).
27. Guzzetta v. Tex. Pipe Line Co., 485 So. 2d 508, 510-11 (La. 1986).
28. Chastant v. Headrick Outdoor, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 105, 110 (W.D. La.
1995), affd, 81 F.3d 31 (5th Cir. 1996); Beacham v. Hardy Outdoor Adver.,
Inc., 520 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
29. Spiker v. City of Baton Rouge, 804 So. 2d 659, 665 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2001), writ denied, 814 So. 2d 564 (La. 2002).
30. Annina v. Eschette, 814 So. 2d 13, 15 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2001), writ
denied, 811 So. 2d 880 (La. 2002).
31. Id.
576 [Vol. 67
driveways32 have been classified as integral parts of the ground,
which cannot be separately owned.
These classifications are specious at best. A septic system and
an underground drainage system bear striking physical similarities,
yet one is classified as "permanently attached" to the ground and
the other as an "integral part" of the ground. Both systems seem to
have the same "connectedness" to the ground, so what is the
logical basis for the distinction?
Common constructions such as koi ponds or underground wells
further demonstrate the problem with the overlap between articles
493 and 493.1. There is no basis for determining whether these
things are "permanently attached" to or "integral parts" of the
ground. These endless problems of classification cause serious
concerns in practice. Lawyers are generally rendered unable to
advise clients with any certainty on such fundamental questions as
who will own things united with a lessor's immovable by a lessee.
C. The Remedies Provided by the Accession Articles
The remedial rules of the accession articles determine the
maker and landowner's rights with respect to the construction.33
Specifically, these rules determine whether the landowner has to
pay the lessee for the construction, whether the landowner can
force the lessee to remove his construction, and whether the lessee
has a right to remove the construction or to be compensated for it.
1. An Overlap Revisited
Much like the rules of ownership, the accession articles in the
Property section of the Code hinge remedies upon the landowner's
consent and the type of improvement. 34  If the landowner
consented to the improvement, the maker may have some
remedies, depending on the type of improvement. 35  If the
32. Id.
33. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 493,495 (2006).
34. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 493,495 (2006).
35. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 493 (2006).
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landowner did not consent to the improvement, the maker may
have no remedy at all.36
Again, if we consider a swimming pool made by the lessee
with the landowners consent, the problem is well-illustrated.
Because we are not sure whether the pool is "permanently
attached" to or an "integral part" of the ground, we are unsure who
owns the pool. This same problem exists in the remedial articles
because the remedial articles have the same overlapping
categories.37 The group of things that are capable of separate
ownership, including, inter alia, buildings and other constructions
permanently attached to the ground, have one set of remedies,
38
while the group of things that are not capable of separate
ownership, including, inter alia, integral parts of the ground, have
another set of remedies.
39
Under either group, the maker has the right to remove the
improvement subject to the obligation of restoring the property to
its former condition. So, regardless of which category the
lessee's pool falls under, if the landowner consented to its
construction, the lessee has the right to remove it at the end of the
lease.
The big difference between the two groups is the result when
the maker does not remove his improvement. If the pool is
considered an "other construction permanently attached to the
ground," and thus in the group of things that may be owned
separately from the ground, the landowner may not remove the
pool at the lessee's expense. 4 1 The landowner's only remedy is to
keep the pool and, if he chooses, become owner of it.42 On the
other hand, if the pool is considered an "integral part" of the
ground, and thus in the category of things that cannot be owned
36. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
37. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 493,495 (2006).
38. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 493 (2006).
39. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 495 (2006).
40. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 493, 495 (2006); Walters v. Greer, 726 So. 2d
1094, 1101 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1999).
41. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 493 (2006).
42. Id.
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separately from the round, the landowner can remove the pool at
the lessee's expense.&
3
This result seems counterintuitive. If the pool is classified as
such a distinct thing that it can be owned separately, it should be
susceptible of removal. On the other hand, if it is classified as
such an integral part of the ground that it cannot be owned
separately, it should not be subject to removal.
This important problem was ignored by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in the highly criticized and eventually legislatively overruled
case, Guzzetta v. Texas Pipe Line Co." Guzzetta owned a large
tract of swampland. His ancestors-in-title had granted Texas Pipe
Line a servitude for a price of $250, which allowed Texas Pipe
Line the right to construct, operate, and remove a pipeline on the
land.45 Texas Pipe Line ran the pipeline three feet below the
ground across Guzzetta's entire tract of land. Upon expiration of
the servitude, Guzzetta no longer wanted his land to be burdened
with an abandoned pipeline, so he requested that Texas Pipe Line
remove it. The cost of removing the pipeline was estimated at
$12,000. Guzzetta argued that the pipeline was an "integral part"
of the ground and he could, therefore, demand that Texas Pipe
Line remove it, or remove it himself at their expense according to
Louisiana Civil Code article 495.
With no discussion of the criteria for its distinction, the court
rejected Guzzetta's argument, finding that the pipeline was instead
an "other construction permanently attached to the ground" under
Louisiana Civil Code article 493.46 Because the court pinned
Guzzetta into article 493, he could not force Texas Pipe Line to
remove the pipeline or remove it himself at their expense.47
Rather, he was forced to keep it.
2. A Gap for Improvements for Which Consent Was Not Given
Deciding which category of remedies an improvement for
which the landowner gave consent falls under is not the only
43. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 495 (2006).
44. 485 So. 2d 508 (La. 1986).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 493 (2006).
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problem with the remedial rules. For some improvements for
which the landowner did not give consent, there are no applicable
Civil Code articles and possibly no remedies. The previously
discussed remedial rules, Louisiana Civil Code articles 493 and
495, apply only if the improvement was made with the
landowner's consent.48 Another set of articles, Louisiana Civil
Code articles 496 and 497, provide some rules regardless of the
49landowner's consent, but only when the maker is a possessor.
These two sets of articles create a huge gap in the Civil Code for
improvements that are made without the landowner's consent by a
lessee, who, by definition, is not a possessor.
50
The Code's deficiencies in this area are evident in the recent
decision of Southern Casing of Louisiana, Inc. v. Houma
Avionics.51 Houma gave Southern Casing permission to build a
hangar on land that Houma leased from the Airport Commission.
Ultimately, Houma and Southern Casing had a dispute over
ownership of the hangar. The trial court analogized the situation to
that of an owner, Houma, and good faith possessor, Southern
Casing, and applied Louisiana Civil Code article 496.52 The result
of the application of this article was that Houma was required to
keep and pay for the hangar. 5
3
The court of appeal rejected the trial court's faulty application
of article 496 but replaced it with its own faulty analysis. The
court of appeal correctly determined that the issue of ownership
48. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 493, 495 (2006).
49. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 496,497 (2006).
50. In order to be a possessor, one must take corporeal possession of the
immovable with the intent to possess as owner. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3424
(2006). This excludes all precarious possessors, such as lessees, that acquire the
property on behalf of someone else, because they lack the requisite intent to
possess as owner. Wilson v. Capitano, 656 So. 2d 696, 698-99 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1995); V & S Planting Co. v. Red River Waterway Comm'n, 472 So. 2d
331, 336 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 475 So. 2d 1106 (La. 1985) (predial
lessee does not qualify as a possessor because the lessee does not possess as
owner according to article 3424; lessee is also not a possessor in "good faith"
under article 487 because he does not possess the land by virtue of an act
translative of ownership); Symeonides, 1983-1984, supra note 24, at 549.
51. 809 So. 2d 1040 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2001).
52. Id. at 1047.
53. Id.
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could not be solved without evidence as to the consent of the
landowner, the Airport Commission.54  Because the Airport
Commission was not made party to the suit and there was no
evidence in the record as to the Airport Commission's consent, the
court of appeal could not resolve the issues of ownership or
remedies. The court of appeal also correctly determined that
Southern Casing was not a possessor in good faith because it did
not possess the leased property by an act translative of ownership,
believing itself to be owner of the leased property. 55 Thus, article
496-covering only "good faith possessors"-could not apply.
However, in dicta, the court of appeal completely
misinterpreted the law of accession. The court stated that if the
Airport Commission were found to be owner of the hangar because
it did not consent to the hangar's construction, the Airport
Commission could demand the demolition and removal of the
hangar based on article 497, addressing constructions made by a
bad faith possessor.56 The court of appeal went on to say that if the
Airport Commission was found to be the owner and chose to keep
the hangar, it would be bound to reimburse Southern Casing under
article 497.57
This analysis is completely incorrect. Articles 496 and 497 do
not apply at all in lease situations because the lessee does not
possess as owner.58 It is article 493 that should apply instead. If
the Airport Commission did not consent to the hangar's
construction on its land, under article 493 it is the owner of the
hangar and owes nothing to Southern Casing.59 This absurd
result-that a lessee who made an unconsented to improvement
had no remedy at law to either remove the improvement or be
54. Id. at 1052 (based on Louisiana Civil Code article 493, the airplane
hangar belongs to the Airport Commission, as owner of the ground, unless it
was built with the Airport Commission's consent).
55. Id. at 1053.
56. Id. at 1052.
57. Id.
58. Wilson v. Capitano, 656 So. 2d 696, 698-99 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995); V
& S Planting Co. v. Red River Waterway Comm'n, 472 So. 2d 331, 336 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1985), writ denied, 475 So. 2d 1106 (La. 1985); Beacham v. Hardy
Outdoor Adver., Inc., 520 So. 2d 1086, 1088-89 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987);
Symeonides, 1983-1984, supra note 24, at 549.
59. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 493 (2006).
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reimbursed for it-is one of the inequities in the accession articles
that the new law of lease sought to rectify.
60
D. Interplay Between Ownership and Remedies: The Evolution of
Article 493
"Article 493 of the Louisiana Civil Code has been largely
misinterpreted by courts and commentators.",61 Because of this
misinterpretation, the article seems to be in a perpetual state of
change. Since its enactment in 1980 it has been amended twice,
62
likely in a legislative attempt to clarify its meaning. Even today, it
is not without fault. The next few sections explore the evolution of
the law of lease through the amendments to article 493.
1. The Original Article 49363
The 1979 revision of the law governing immovables allowed
buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground,
timber, and unharvested crops in Louisiana to be owned separately
from the ground.64 Article 493 was needed to determine who was
the owner of these improvements. 65 As enacted in 1979, it stated,
in relevant part:
Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the
ground, and plantings made on the land of another with his
60. Melerine v. State, 773 So. 2d 831, 839 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000), writ
denied, 789 So. 2d 595 (La. 2001) (person making the building has no rights
whatsoever when he permanently attaches a building to the land of another
without the landowner's permission). Some courts resolve the issue under
alternative equitable theories, such as unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and
equitable estoppel, but there is a lack of consistency. See, e.g., Carriere v. Bank
of La., 702 So. 2d 648 (La. 1996); Haring v. Stinson, 756 So. 2d 1201 (La. App.
2d Cir. 2000); Gray v. McCormick, 663 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995);
Kibbe v. Lege, 604 So. 2d 1366 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 606 So. 2d 540
(La. 1992).
61. Yiannopoulos, supra note 12, at § 116.5, at 271.
62. 2003 La. Acts No. 715, § 1; 1984 La. Acts No. 933, § 1.
63. This article had no prior counterpart in the Code of 1870. Dep't of
Wildlife & Fisheries v. Anchor Gasoline Corp., 669 So. 2d 470, 475 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1996).
64. Yiannopoulos, supra note 12, at § 116.5, at 272.
65. Id.
[Vol. 67
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consent belong to him who made them. They belong to the
owner of the ground when they are made without his
consent.
66
This first paragraph remained unchanged through the two
subsequent revisions and is still effective today verbatim. 67 This
original version had a significant and obvious flaw: it was silent
with respect to the rights and obligations of the maker and
landowner after termination of their legal relationship. 68  To
appreciate the significance of this silence, recall, for example, the
problem of a house built by a lessee with the lessor's consent.
Under the original version of article 493, this house would be a
building made on the land of another and would, therefore, belong
to the person that made it, the lessee.69 But, what happens when
the lease terminates and the lessor no longer wants the lessee on
his land? There is now a building that belongs to one person on
land that belongs to another and no legal relationship between the
two. The 1980 version of article 493 provided no guidance on this
issue. The significant gap led to a prompt legislative revision.
2. The 1984 Amendment 7
0
Louisiana Civil Code article 493 was amended in 1984 with the
addition of a second paragraph, which stated, in relevant part:
When the owner of buildings, other constructions
permanently attached to the ground, or plantings no longer
has the right to keep them on the land of another, he may
remove them subject to his obligation to restore the
property to its former condition. If he does not remove
them within 90 days after written demand, the owner of the
66. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 493 (1980) (amended 1984). The 1979
enactment had two additional paragraphs which were later redesignated as
articles 493.1 and 493.2, with no change in the law, by 1984 La. Acts No. 933, §
1. Similarly, lease article 2726 originally only cross-referenced article 493, but
was then amended to add articles 493.1, 493.2, and 495 in the same act. See
1984 La. Acts No. 933, § 1.
67. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 493 (2006).
68. Yiannopoulos, supra note 12, at § 116.5, at 272-73.
69. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 493 (1980).
70. 1984 La. Acts No. 933, § 1.
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land acquires ownership of the improvements and owes
nothing to their former owner.71
This additional paragraph filled the gap left in the 1980 version
of the article by providing a remedy when the parties' legal
relationship ends. Under the 1984 amendment, the lessee can
remove the house he constructed with the landowner's consent and
restore the lessor's land to its former condition. However, if the
lessee does not remove the house within ninety days of the lessor's
demand, ownership of the house transfers from lessee to lessor
with the lessor owing nothing to the lessee.72
The 1984 amendment was an adequate remedy if the
landowner wanted the improvement, but created a new problem for
unwanted improvements. Judicial interpretations of this second
paragraph saddled landowners with unwanted improvements and
provided them no remedy for removal.73
For instance, suppose that instead of a nice house, the lessee
built a dilapidated shack that was an eyesore. Assume further that
at the end of the lease, the lessee moved out with no intention of
removing the shack from the lessor's land. Under the 1984
amendment, ninety days after demand for removal, ownership of
the shack automatically transferred to the lessor. This is precisely
the result that was obtained with the unwanted pipeline in the
Louisiana Supreme Court Guzzetta opinion, previously addressed
above.74
Civilian scholars decried the Guzzetta interpretation as
inconsistent with the civil law notions that ownership is presumed
to be free of all burdens, legal or physical, and that a landowner
has the right to demand the removal of any structure that
encroaches upon his property.75 One of these scholars, Symeon
Symeonides, explained the problematic relationship between the
rules on ownership and remedies in accession law as follows:
71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 493 (1984) (amended 2004).
72. Id.
73. Guzzetta v. Tex. Pipe Line Co., 485 So. 2d 508 (La. 1986); Anderson v.
Tenneco Oil Co., 826 So. 2d 1143 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 828 So. 2d
585 (La. 2002); Melerine v. State, 773 So. 2d 831, 837 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000),
writ denied, 789 So. 2d 595 (La. 2001).
74. 485 So. 2d 508; see discussion supra Part I.C.1.
75. Yiannopoulos, supra note 12, at § 116.10, at 20 (Supp. 2005).
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If a thing is incorporated into your land in such a way as
to become an integral part of it, we call that thing a
component part of your land. This means that the thing is
yours, whether or not you consented to its incorporation.
If, however, you consented to such incorporation, you may
force the person who made it to remove the thing at his
expense, although the thing belongs to you and no longer to
him.
On the other hand, if the thing is not so incorporated into
your land, but is merely attached to it permanently with
your consent, then we do not call that thing a component
part of your land. Obviously, this means that the thing is
not yours. Although it is not yours and you may not want
to have it, it may somehow become yours, if the person
who put it there does not want to remove it.
7 6
This explanation articulates the illogical scheme of the law of
accession in 1984. However, the problems did not end with a mere
absence of logic. The court's analysis in Guzzetta caused even
more trouble for landowner liability. In Melerine v. State, for
instance, ownership of an abandoned oil well casing reverted to the
State of Louisiana when the maker did not remove it within ninety
days.77 Therefore, the state was liable for tort damages when a
fisherman's boat struck the oil well casing. 78  Similarly, in
Anderson v. Tenneco Oil Co., ownership of an unmarked piling
reverted to the State of Louisiana when the maker failed to remove
it.79  Therefore, the state was liable for tort damages when a
shrimper's boat struck the piling.80 This undesirable result of
landowner liability for wholly unwanted improvements led to yet
another revision of article 493.
76. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 450-51 (citing LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
493, as interpreted in Guzzetta) (citations omitted).
77. 773 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000).
78. Id. at 842.
79. 826 So. 2d 1143 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2002).
80. Id.
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3. Current Article 493
In the most recent revision of Louisiana Civil Code article 493,
in 2003, the first paragraph was again left unchanged. However,
the text of the second paragraph was changed as follows:
When the owner of buildings, other constructions
permanently attached to the ground, or plantings no longer
has the right to keep them on the land of another, he may
remove them subject to his obligation to restore the
property to its former condition. If he does not remove
them within 90 ninety days after written demand, the owner
of the land aequims may. after the ninetieth day from the
date of mailing the written demand, appropriate ownership
of the improvements by providing additional written notice
by certified mail, and upon receipt of the certified mail by
the owner of the improvements, the owner of the land
obtains ownership of the improvements and owes nothing
to thei- fefine the owner of the improvements. Until such
time as the owner of the land appropriates the
improvements, the improvements shall remain the property
of he who made them and he shall be solely responsible for
any harm caused by the improvements ....
The historical progression of article 493 leaves little doubt as to
the legislature's intention in this revision. Still, House Concurrent
Resolution No. 306 of 2004 makes it clear that:
[Ilts intent in the enactment of Act No. 715 of the 2003
Regular Session was to legislatively overrule the decisions
in Guzzetta, Melerine and Anderson to the extent those
cases held that the provisions of Civil Code article 493
bestowed ownership of improvements, as a matter of law,
on the owner of land on which the improvements had been
made by another merely with his consent without specific
claim to ownership of the improvements by the landowner,
to this extent, Act No. 715 of the 2003 Regular Session is
81. 2003 La. Acts No. 715, § I (st~4ket e gh indicates text that was deleted
and underline indicates text that was added).
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procedural and interpretative and is to be applied
retroactively.
8 2
It is yet to be determined how courts will interpret this
amendment and what new problems may lie ahead. One, as yet
jurisprudentially unrecognized problem with article 493, is an
equitable issue that has remained unchanged through the two
revisions. This problem concerns the first paragraph of article 493.
If the legislature finds it unfair to bestow ownership on a
landowner who originally consented to an improvement, but now
no longer wants it, it seems even more inequitable to bestow
ownership on a landowner that never consented to the
improvement in the first place.
83
For example, assume that, without the landowner's consent, a
lessee constructs a dilapidated shack on his leased property. Even
after the 2003 revision, the first paragraph of article 493 bestows
ownership on the landowner for the unconsented to and unwanted
improvement. 84  The second paragraph of article 493 does not
apply to such an improvement because it is not one for which
consent was given. As a result, the problems of Guzzetta,
Melerine, and Anderson continue to apply to improvements made
without the landowner's consent.
In the style of Professor Symeonides, an explanation of the
persisting problem would be as follows: If the thing is not so
incorporated into your land as to become an integral part of it, but
is merely attached to it permanently with your consent, then we do
82. H.R. Con. Res. 306, 2004 Reg. Sess. (La.); Yiannopoulos, supra note
12, at § 116.10, at 21-22 (Supp. 2005).
83. Melerine v. State, 773 So. 2d 831, 837 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000), writ
denied, 789 So. 2d 595 (La. 2001) (second sentence of Louisiana Civil Code
article 493 automatically vests ownership in the landowner of buildings
permanently attached to land by someone other than the landowner, without the
landowner's permission-a rule that apparently applies whether or not the
landowner wants the building).
84. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 493 (2006).
85. The second paragraph of article 493 only applies when the maker no
longer has the right to keep his improvement on the land. Without the
landowner's consent, the maker never had the right to have his improvement on
the land. Thus, the second paragraph does not apply. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 493 (2006).
2007)
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not call that thing a component part of your land.86 However, if
you did not consent to the thing being incorporated into your land,
then we do call that thing a component part of your land.87 This
means that the thing is yours. 88 Even though you may not want to
have the thing, it is yours and you cannot demand that the person
who put it on your land without your consent remove it.8
9
In the case of an unwanted improvement, this result is absurd.
Even after two revisions, Louisiana Civil Code article 493 retains
the problem of burdening landowners with these unwanted items.
4. Abandonment as a Way Out of the Accession Articles?
Given the plethora of problems with the law of accession, it is
no wonder that Louisiana courts have tried to avoid opening the
"cans of worms." 90 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Smith v. State
Department of Transportation recently used abandonment instead
of accession to resolve the issue of improvements made to leased
property.91
Smith leased a commercial building from its owner, Unkel, and
used the building to run his business, B&K Music. 92 During the
lease term, Smith made various improvements to the interior of the
building, such as installing signs and air conditioners, mostly with
the consent and knowledge of the lessor.93 After eighteen years,
the parties agreed to terminate the lease due to the imminent threat
of expropriation by the State of Louisiana; the building was to be
torn down so that the state could expand a highway.94 Smith was
86. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 463,464, 493 (2006).
87. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 463,464, 493 (2006).
88. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 493 (2006).
89. Id.
90. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 451.
91. 899 So. 2d 516 (La. 2005). Smith is actually a combination of two
separate suits that Smith filed against Unkel and the State Department of
Transportation and Development ("DOTD"). Id. at 519. The court of appeal
found the DOTD not liable for the improvements, and Smith did not appeal, thus
making the judgment final. Id. at 534.
92. Id. at 520.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 521.
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given ample opportunity95 to remove all items he wished to remove
from the building and, upon returning his key to Unkel, Smith
indicated that all items he desired to keep had been removed.96
Unkel then sold the building to the state in lieu of expropriation.97
A month after the sale was complete; Smith's attorney sent a letter
to Unkel demanding payment for the improvements under article
495.98
The district court determined that after termination of the lease,
the lessor elected to keep the improvements and was, therefore,
entitled to compensation under article 495. 99 Noting that Unkel was
well aware that Smith wanted compensation for the improvements
and that at no time did Smith abandon his request for that
compensation, the district court determined that Unkel elected to
keep the improvements because he: (1) sold the property with the
improvements attached; and (2) went back after the sale and
removed one of the improvements, an air conditioner, to keep for
himself.'00 Therefore, Unkel was ordered to pay Smith $500 for the
improvements Smith made to the leased property, particularly his
B&K Music Sign.' 0 1
In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeal found no error in
the trial court's award of damages to the lessee under article 495.02
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. It disagreed with
the trial court's factual determination that Unkel elected to keep the
improvements. The Louisiana Supreme Court instead concluded
that Smith was not entitled to the value of his improvements because
he abandoned them and made no attempt to remove them or request
their removal. Thus, article 495 did not apply.'0 3 The Louisiana
95. Unkel allowed Smith to extend the lease by a month and a day in order
to accommodate the move. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 531 (had the land actually been expropriated, Smith would have
been limited to recovery only against the expropriator and not the lessor under
pre-revision article 2697).
98. Id. at 521.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 523-24.
101. Id. at 522.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 519-20.
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Supreme Court's only basis for its reversal was its factual finding
that Unkel did not elect to keep the improvements.
New Louisiana Civil Code article 2695 was not applicable here
because the facts occurred before its passage. 1 4 But the Louisiana
Supreme Court's avoidance of the accession question raises the
issue of what precedent Smith leaves after the 2005 revision, and
whether abandonment may still provide an escape from the
accession rules under the newly-revised law of lease. 105
II. CLARITY THROUGH A NEW AND "SELF-CONTAINED" ACCESSION
ARTICLE TAILORED TO LEASE
The Louisiana Legislature charged the Louisiana State Law
Institute ("Law Institute") with the revision of the lease articles in
the Civil Code. As part of this revision, the Law Institute
necessarily had to revisit the question of accession in lease
situations. Revised Louisiana Civil Code article 2695 was
introduced as a solution to the problems created by the previous
cross-reference to the general accession articles. 0 6 The next few
sections discuss the history of article 2695's enactment, the
problems it solves, and the new problems it creates.
A. The History ofArticle 2695 "s Enactment
When the Law Institute began to undertake the lease revision,
the reporter for the Lease Committee, Symeon Symeonides,
explained to the Lease Committee the deficiencies in the pre-
revision scheme for additions to leased property created by the
cross-reference to the general accession code articles. 0 7 Following
that presentation, the Law Institute authorized Symeonides to revise
not only the law of leases, but also the general accession articles, the
latter in cooperation with the Property Reporter.10 8  However, to
104. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (2006).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Letter from Symeon Symeonides, Reporter, Lease Revision, Louisiana
State Law Institute, to The Coordinating Committee and Advisory Committee
on Leases, Louisiana State Law Institute (Re: Review of Lease Revision) (Apr.
13, 2003).
108. Id.
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save time, the Law Institute decided to leave the revision of the
general accession articles to the Property Reporter.'0 9 To this day,
the general accession articles have not been revised; therefore, all of
the inconsistencies and inequities present in those articles remain.
The Law Institute did go forward with the lease revision and
devised a solution to avoid the problems created by the cross-
reference to the accession articles. Comment (c) to revised article
2695 makes it clear that the new article is intended to be a "self-
contained rule""10 applicable to leases and is meant to fill the gaps
created by the pre-revision cross-reference. I '
The Law Institute ultimately proposed the following to the
Louisiana Legislature:
Article 2695. Attachments, additions, or other improvements
to leased thing
In the absence of contrary agreement, upon termination of
the lease, the rights and obligations of the parties with regard
to attachments, additions, or other improvements made to the
leased thing by the lessee are as follows:
(1) The lessee may remove all improvements that he made to
the leased thing, provided that he restore the thing to its
former condition.
(2) If the lessee does not remove the improvements, the
lessor may:
(a) Appropriate ownership of the improvements by
reimbursing the lessee for their costs or for the
enhanced value of the leased thing whichever is less; or
(b) Demand that the lessee remove the improvements
within a reasonable time and restore the leased thing
to its former condition. If the lessee fails to do so,
the lessor may remove the improvements and restore
109. Id.
110. This was a poor word choice by the drafter of the comment. A civil
code is an interdependent document in which each article is read in light of its
relation to other articles on the same subject matter. See Alain Levasseur, On
the Structure of a Civil Code, 44 TUL. L. REV. 693, 700-03 (1970). A civil code
is not simply a list of "self-contained" rules to be read in isolation. Id.
111. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2695 cmt. (c) (2006).
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the leased thing to its former condition at the expense
of the lessee or appropriate ownership of the
improvements without any obligation of
reimbursement to the lessee." 
2
This draft article was not accepted by the legislature as written.
Instead, the Senate Committee amended the article in two ways.
First, at the end of the draft article section (2)(b), the legislature
added: "Appropriation of the improvement by the lessor may only
be accomplished by providing additional notice by certified mail to
the lessee after expiration of the time given the lessee to remove the
improvements."' 13  Second, the legislature added section (2)(c),
which states: "Until such time as the lessor appropriates the
improvement, the improvements shall remain the property of the
lessee and the lessee shall be solely responsible for any harm caused
by the improvements."
114
These amendments bear a striking resemblance to the 2003
amendments to article 493.' 15 It appears that the legislature was
again trying to avoid the problem created by Guzzetta,"1
6
Melerine,117 and Anderson 1 8 of forcing ownership of unwanted
improvements on landowners. Unfortunately, these added
provisions cause problems of their own.
B. Overlap Rears Its Ugly Head Yet Again
Louisiana Civil Code article 2695 does not regulate ownership
of improvements." 9  It only addresses remedies available to
lessees and lessors upon termination of the lease. 120 In order to
112. H.R. 38, 2004 Leg. Reg. Sess. (La.) (codified at 2004 La. Acts No. 821).
113. Amendments proposed by Senate Committee on Judiciary A to
Reengrossed House Bill No. 38 by Representative Ansardi, available at
http://www.legis.state.la.us/legdocs/04RS/CVT4/out/OOOOLR40.pdf.
114. Id.
115. See discussion supra Part I.D.3.
116. 485 So. 2d 508 (La. 1986).
117. 773 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000), writ denied, 789 So. 2d 595
(La. 2001).
118. 826 So. 2d 1143 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 828 So. 2d 585 (La.
2002).
119. LA. Cw. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (2006).
120. Id.
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determine ownership of the improvements, one must look beyond
the "self-contained" article to the general law of accession yet
again.
Recall the problem of determining whether a swimming pool
the lessee constructs on the lessor's property is an article 493 other
construction "permanently attached" to or an article 493.1 "integral
part" of the ground. If it is the former, the pool is in a category of
things that can be owned separately from the ground and
ownership will depend on the landowner's consent. In this
instance, the remedies available to the respective parties are found
in article 493.
If it is the latter, an integral part, the pool belongs to the
landowner because it is in a category of things that cannot be
owned separately from the ground, and the remedies available are
found in article 495. This problem of determining ownership still
exists even after the 2005 revision, though the problem of
determining remedies is solved.
C. Elimination of a Distinction Based on Improvement Type
Louisiana Civil Code article 2695 solves the problem created
by the overlap in categories with regard to remedies by eliminating
the distinction based on the type of improvement. Article 2695
applies to "attachments, additions, or other improvements.' 21
Comment (a) to article 2695 clarifies that attachments and
additions are types of improvements and that "other
improvements" may include items mentioned in other Code
articles. 122 Articles 493 and 495 are specifically listed among
those other articles to which article 2695 is supposed to apply. 123
Thus, under the new article, the lessee and lessor will have the
same remedies under revised article 2695, regardless of whether
the swimming pool is in the category of things that can be owned
separately from the underlying immovable or the category which
cannot. Either way, the lessee will first have the option to remove
the pool. If he does not, then the landowner can: (1) appropriate
121. Id.
122. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 cmt (a) (2006).
123. Id. (other articles that are within the scope of 2695 are articles 463, 465,
466, 491,496, and 510).
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ownership of the pool by reimbursing the lessee for his costs or the
enhanced value of the land; (2) demand that the lessee remove the
pool; (3) remove the pool himself at the lessee's expense; or (4) if
the lessee does not remove the pool after demand, appropriate
ownership of the improvement, owing nothing to the lessee.12
Thus, the overlap is reconciled under the new law of lease.
But, applying article 2695(2)(c) to both types of improvements,
regardless of consent, creates yet another serious anomaly. How
can something that cannot be owned separately from the
underlying immovable, such as integral parts of the ground,
building materials, or component parts of a building, at the same
time belong to the lessee according to article 2695(2)(c)? 125
For example, assume that the lessee's pool is classified under
article 493.1 as an "integral part" of the ground that cannot be
owned separately from the owner of the ground. If we apply
article 2695, section (2)(c) suggests that after the lease terminates,
if the lessee does not remove the pool (which the lessor owns
according to article 493.1), and the lessor does not appropriate the
improvements (which he already owns), then the improvements
remain the property of the lessee and the lessee shall be solely
responsible for any harm caused by the improvements. This is
true, even though the lessee never owned the improvements and, in
the case of article 493.1, the improvements are not capable of
being owned by someone other than the owner of the ground. This
is a problem that the Senate Committee apparently did not consider
when adding section (2)(c) to article 2695. This added provision
simply cannot be reconciled with article 493.1 and the theory that
some things cannot be owned separately from the owner of the
ground.
D. Elimination of a Distinction Based on Consent
Recall that the general accession articles provide remedies for
consented to improvements and unconsented to improvements
made by possessors, but not for unconsented to improvements
124. LA. CtV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (2006).
125. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 493.1 (2006).
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made by precarious possessors, such as lessees.' 26 In order to fill
this gap, revised article 2695 provides the same remedies for
improvements, regardless of landowner consent. 127 This change
fills the gap for improvements constructed by lessees without
consent and also solves the problem of the faulty application of
articles 496 and 497 to non-possessors, as illustrated in Southern
Casing of Louisiana v. Houma Avionics. 128
Although article 2695 solves two problems, it raises a new
question of whether the policies it expresses are equitable. Moving
from no remedy to providing the same remedy for lessees who
obtained owner consent and those who did not is certainly a drastic
change. In evaluating the legislature's policy decision, it is
important to realize that article 2695, as well as the general
accession articles, are suppletive. 29 Therefore, article 2695 is a
default provision and will only apply in the absence of a prior
agreement between the lessor and lessee as to the fate of
improvements made to the leased property. 130
Many academics support the notion that default terms should
be set at what the parties would have wanted had they negotiated
the transaction. 13 1  Under this theory, the convergence of the
remedies for consented to and unconsented to improvements seems
logical. If the contracting parties had negotiated, consent would
not be an issue, and, therefore, not be a basis for differing
remedies. Bargaining lessors and lessees would likely negotiate
for similar remedies. Namely, lessees would want the right to
remove their improvements or be compensated for them, and
lessors would want the option of appropriating ownership of
improvements or forcing the lessees to remove them at the lessees'
expense.
However, evaluating article 2695 in terms of whether it
comports with what the parties would have wanted had they
negotiated ignores the fact that, with regard to improvements for
126. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 493, 495-97 (2006).
127. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (2006).
128. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
129. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 cmt. (b) (2006).
130. Id.
131. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89-90 (1989).
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which the lessee did not obtain consent, he intentionally avoided a
negotiation with the lessor. It seems inequitable to give a lessee
who does not get the lessor's consent to make an improvement the
same rights as a lessee who does. In the case of the unconsented to
improvement, the lessee should have limited rights. Such a
limitation is necessary to encourage lessees to get permission
before making improvements to the leased property. Other civil
law jurisdictions treat makers with consent differently from those
who proceed without it for this very reason.' 32 Louisiana's new
lease redactors would have done better to follow their lead.
Symeonides once proposed that a distinction based on consent
be incorporated into article 2695, but it never came to fruition.'
33
During a drafting meeting, Symeonides himself noted that new
article 2695 leaves a "major equity gap: in cases involving
valuable improvements that were made with the lessor's consent
but which cannot be removed without substantial damage to
themselves or to the thing, the lessee is left without an effective
remedy while the lessor may be unjustly enriched."' 134 Symeonides
was asked to review the matter and return to the Law Institute with
a recommendation to fill the gap.' 35  At the next meeting, he
suggested remedying the problem by distinguishing rights based on
lessor consent. He proposed the creation of two alternatives: (1) if
the improvements had been made without the lessor's consent,
then the lessee must compensate the lessor; and (2) if the
improvements had been made with the lessor's consent, then he
must pay the lessee some reimbursement.' 36 However, at the next
meeting of the Lease Committee, no one moved to reconsider
article 2695. The gap therefore remains today.'
37
132. ITALIAN CIv. CODE art. 1593; ARGENT. Civ. CODE art. 1573.
133. Louisiana State Law Institute, Notes Prepared for Meeting of Council
(Sept. 14-15, 2001).
134. Louisiana State Law Institute, Minutes (May 18-19, 2001). At the time
this gap was noticed, the proposed article was similar to what was eventually
enacted, but not exactly the same. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (2006).
135. Louisiana State Law Institute, Minutes (May 18-19, 2001).
136. Louisiana State Law Institute, Notes Prepared for Meeting of Council
(Sept. 14-15, 2001).
137. Louisiana State Law Institute, Minutes (Dec. 21-22, 2001).
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E. The Possibility ofAbandonment
Recall the Louisiana Supreme Court's use of abandonment as a
method of avoiding the application of the accession articles in
Smith v. State Department of Transportation.138  The court
circumvented the application of article 495 by finding that the
lessee abandoned the improvements. Such an approach may not be
possible under new article 2695. The major obstacle is 2695's
section (2)(c): "Until such time as the lessor appropriates the
improvement, the improvements shall remain the property of the
lessee and the lessee shall be solely responsible for any harm
caused by the improvements."' 39 Article 495 contains no such
provision.
If the facts of Smith occurred today, article 2695 section (2)(c)
would likely change the analysis. The improvements would have
remained the property of Smith until such time as Unkel, the
landowner, appropriated ownership of them. How could the court
determine that the lessee abandoned his improvements, and at the
same time that they remain the lessee's property? The Smith
opinion seems irreconcilable with article 2695(2)(c).
III. CONCLUSION
The Law Institute and legislature's goals in revising the rules
regarding constructions on leased property are certainly admirable
ones. New article 2695 solves many of the problems of the old
law. In the context of the lessee-constructed house and pool
referenced in the Introduction, the lessee still owns the house and
still has the first right to remove it, and the lessor still has the right
to demand that the lessee remove it. Importantly, the gap for
unwanted improvements has now been filled. Under new article
2695, if the landowner does not want the house, he has the right to
remove it at the lessee's expense. Before 2005, he had no such
right.
The overlap between other constructions "permanently
attached" to and "integral parts" of the ground has not been
138. 899 So. 2d 516 (La. 2005). See also discussion supra Part I.D.4.
139. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695(2)(c) (2006).
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remedied. Even today, we do not know who owns the swimming
pool. However, we do know the remedies available with respect to
the lessor and lessee. Remedial rules are clearly detailed in article
2695. Here, the lessor can remove the pool at the lessee's expense,
should the lessor so choose. Before the 2005 revision, it was
unclear whether the lessor could remove an improvement at the
lessee's expense. The right to removal depended on whether the
pool was covered under overlapping articles 493 or 495.
There also seems to be a disconnect between the new remedial
rules in article 2695, in particular section (2)(c), and the ownership
rules in articles 493 and 493.1 If the pool is classified as an
"integral part" of the ground then article 493.1 says the pool must
belong to the landowner-lessor. However, article 2695(2)(c) says
that the pool belongs to the lessee until the landowner appropriates
ownership. There seems to be no way to reconcile the new
remedial rules with the established ownership rules.
Problems of consent have been remedied. If a construction is
made without the landowner's consent, it still belongs to the
landowner. However, the Civil Code now provides remedies for
unconsented to improvements as well. The lessee and lessor now
have the exact same remedies for improvements under article
2695, regardless of owner consent. Whether this is a change for
the better is certainly debatable.
Overall, the recent lease revision solves a few of the major
inequities with the previous law of lease, carries over some of the
past problems, and creates some new anomalies. The Law Institute
successfully fit most of the worms back into the can, but several
are still wiggling around loose.
Brad R. Resweber
* The author would like to thank Professor Andrea Beauchamp Carroll for
her invaluable assistance throughout the drafting of this comment and Lacie N.
Quinn for her patience and support.
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